A joint transitional government, prisoner exchange and, in one year, political elections. These, in a nutshell, are the terms of the agreement signed in Cairo by Fatah (Mahmoud Abbas’s party, which controls the West Bank) and Hamas (the party that is lead by Khaled Mashal, in exile in Damascus, and that since 2007 has governed the Gaza Strip through the government led by Ismail Haniyeh).

Mahmud Abbas (left) with Ismail Haniyeh.

Is it a solid, long-lasting agreement? Is it a way to stall? Time will answer the first question, and it won’t take long. Just remember that Mahmoud Abbas proposed a similar agreement in February and that the leaders of Hamas rejected it. Many hard feelings exist between the two parties, many people have died on both sides of the fence. And then, the fundamental question remains: in the West Bank, Fatah has shifted toward accepting the state of Israel while Hamas still has the destruction of the Jewish State in its statute (and in practice: the latest missiles were launched from the Strip against Israel some days ago). Either Hamas becomes pacific or Fatah becomes a warmonger.

When news of the agreement broke, Israel’s reaction was furious. Their reasoning is this: if you make peace with Hamas, who’s at war with us, then you’re at war with us too. The good Mr. Lieberman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that “such an agreement is crossing a red line” and went so far as to threaten sanctions.

However, nothing else could be expected. First of all because if the agreement works, the Palestinians will show up stronger at the peace talks, which lead nowhere but continue nonetheless. Second because for some time Israel has been trapped in two dead-end positions. On the one hand, the danger of “Iranization” of the Middle East. There is no sign of this (in fact, quite the opposite seems to be the case), but this is Lieberman and Netanyahu’s mantra. On the other hand, the strategy of silently yet constantly reducing the Palestinians’ territory by razing homes in East Jerusalem, plus the wall, checkpoints in the West Bank and so on. This is a strategy that actually works against Israel, because there are millions of Palestinians, they need to live somewhere, and herding them here and there only creates instability and the risk of war (just look at Lebanon in the ’80s) in a region like the Middle East, which is practically instable as a vocation.

But the agreement between Hamas and Fatah appears above all to be the Palestinians’ attempt to harmonize with a Middle East that–in the hodgepodge of uprisings and wars over recent months–already seems to be greatly changed. Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas have lost the protector they had in Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; Khaled Mashal and Hamas might soon lose the support of Syria and President Assad, struggling with popular uprisings and diplomatic pressure from the U.S. Meanwhile, Iran, a strong financial backer of Hamas, needs to move very cautiously. The same thing goes for Hezbollah in Lebanon, now that it’s taken on political control of the country. Hypothetical agreement is the Palestinians’ attempt to join forces while the traditional reference points falter and the litany against Israel or the attacks seem to be remnants of the past.

The most interesting aspect of the question, however, appears to be Egypt’s position. Who would have imagined that the transitional military government would be capable of handling a “diplomatic” operation which is so delicate and, at the same time, so demanding when it comes to Israel and, consequently, the U.S., which Netanyahu will be visiting in a few days? Might we imagine that Obama, a great supporter of regime change in Egypt, also had something to do with this turn of events regarding Palestine? Egypt’s participation is a first significant victory for the Palestinians. The agreement’s having been signed, whether the unity of the Palestinians is true or artificial, it will be difficult to deny them greater flexibility at the Rafah border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.